Semantics, conceptual spaces, and the meeting of minds

 Language -> World a. Extensional: Tarskian model theory i. Proposition -> Truth Value I(P(c)) = true iff c ∈ P = {x1,...,xn} b. Intensional: i. Proposition -> Possible Worlds -> Truth Values Vw(P(c)) = true iff c ∈ P = {x1,...,xn} in world w c. Problems: i. Does not involve language users ii. Does not explain how users “grasp” meanings iii. Requires truth function that does not adequately account for properties 1. How can color of ink, aroma of coffee or shape of your hand be functions in this sense? 2. Goodman’s riddle of induction (green-blue vs grue-bleen) 3. Stalnaker’s antiessentialism argument 4. Putnam’s cat on a mat  Language -> Mental States a. “Cognitive Semantics” i. Psychologically motivated ii. “Truth” is in the mind iii. Examples: 1. Stalnaker’s information states, update semantics, dynamic epistemic logic, etc. b. Problem: i. How do we explain communication?  Language = Use a. Late Wittgenstein (Philosophische Untersuchungen) b. “Socio-Cognitive Semantics” i. Provides cognitive semantics with explanation for communication