Bad Reputation ∗ Jeffrey
نویسندگان
چکیده
We construct a model where the reputational concern of the long-run player to look good in the current period results in the loss of all surplus. This is in contrast to the bulk of literature on reputations where such considerations mitigate myopic incentive problems. We also show that in models where all parties have long-run objectives, such losses can be avoided.
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تاریخ انتشار 2003