Sizing up the Adversary : Leader Attributes , Credibility , and Reciprocation in International Conflict

Leaders negotiate, not states, yet the extensive body of work on credibility in international interactions focuses almost exclusively on regime type. In this paper we argue that when sizing up the credibility of a threat, leaders draw cues from the experiential and physical attributes of their adversary as well as the political institutions of the country they govern. Specifically, we assess military experience, age, gender, and paths to power—attributes that are directly related to risk acceptance and attitudes toward the use of force. Because these attributes bear a relationship with the propensity of leaders to bluff or initiate disputes and are transparent to their adversaries, they become powerful heuristics that provide insight into credibility. Drawing on new data on leader attributes, we provide evidence of this influence in the context of both dispute and compellent threat reciprocation. How credible are the cues sent by world leaders? When Kim Jong Un threatens a nuclear attack on South Korea and nearby U.S. military bases if his country’s enemies “make even the slightest movement,” should we believe him? How accurately do world leaders interpret the signals sent by others? The underlying question of the extent to which leaders can effectively send and interpret credible signals is critical to international relations. Research by Fearon (1994), Schultz (1998), and others suggests that the ability of states to make credible commitments—to war, peace, or diplomacy—is essential to success in international