Coalition-proofness and Dominance Relations
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper examines the relationship between coalition-proof Nash equilibria based on different dominance relations. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999) pointed out that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination does not necessarily coincide with that under strict domination. We show that, if a game satisfies the conditions of anonymity, monotone externality, and strategic substitutability, then the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strict domination contains that under weak domination. The above three conditions are met by standard Cournot oligopoly games and participation games in a mechanism producing a public good.
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