Wang and Wittgenstein

No account of Hao Wang’s philosophy can be complete without discussion of his serious engagement with Wittgenstein. This began in the period 1953-1958, immediately following the publication of Philosophical Investigations [1953] and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics [1956], and culminated in a second phase of engagement from 1981 to 1995. It closed in the final chapter, “Alternative philosophies as complementary,” of Wang’s posthumously published A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy ([1996a], cited hereafter as LJ). Wang’s work on Wittgenstein thus preceded the discussions he had with Gödel (starting from 1967), and at least partly shaped his articulations of Gödel’s philosophy. Unlike Gödel, Kreisel, and Bernays—with whom he worked on logic and philosophy and whose readings and criticisms of Wittgenstein Wang took seriously—Wang was inclined increasingly over time to claim that Wittgenstein, despite certain limitations of his approach, had made fundamental and constructive contributions to philosophy.