Sequential Equilibrium in Games of Imperfect Recall
نویسندگان
چکیده
Definitions of sequential equilibrium and perfect equilibrium are given in games of imperfect recall. Subtleties regarding the definition are discussed. JEL Classification numbers: C70, D81.
منابع مشابه
Sequential Equilibrium and Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Imperfect Recall
Definitions of sequential equilibrium and perfect equilibrium are given in games of imperfect recall.
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تاریخ انتشار 2016