Public goods in relation to competition, cooperation, and spite.

Competition between species can stabilize public-goods cooperation within a species

Competition between species is a major ecological force that can drive evolution. Here, we test the effect of this force on the evolution of cooperation within a species. We use sucrose metabolism of budding yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, as a model cooperative system that is subject to social parasitism by cheater strategies. We find that when cocultured with a bacterial competitor, Escheric...

Replicator dynamics for optional public good games.

The public goods game represents a straightforward generalization of the prisoner's dilemma to an arbitrary number of players. Since the dominant strategy is to defect, both classical and evolutionary game theory predict the asocial outcome that no player contributes to the public goods. In contrast to the compulsory public goods game, optional participation provides a natural way to avoid dead...

Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game

Inspired by the fact that people have diverse propensities to punish wrongdoers, we study a spatial public goods game with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators. During the game, cooperators punish defectors with class-specific probabilities and subsequently share the associated costs of sanctioning. We show that in the presence of different punishing cooperators the highest le...

Competition Between Species can Drive Public-goods Cooperation within a Species

Between-group competition and human cooperation

A distinctive feature of human behaviour is the widespread occurrence of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Explaining the maintenance of costly within-group cooperation is a challenge because the incentive to free ride on the efforts of other group members is expected to lead to decay of cooperation. However, the costs of cooperation can be diminished or overcome when there is competitio...

Kin competition and the evolution of cooperation.

Kin and multilevel selection theories predict that genetic structure is required for the evolution of cooperation. However, local competition among relatives can limit cooperative benefits, antagonizing the evolution of cooperation. We show that several ecological factors determine the extent to which kin competition constrains cooperative benefits. In addition, we argue that cooperative acts t...