Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
نویسندگان
چکیده
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer. Department of Economics University of Bonn D-53113 Bonn, Phone: +49(0228)739220 Fax: +49(0228)739221 * Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, School of Economics Email: [email protected] ** Sung-Buk Ku An-am Dong 5-1, Seoul 136-701, Korea, Email: [email protected] *** Corresponding Author: Institute of Economic Theory I, Humboldt University at Berlin, Email: [email protected]
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 43 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014