Nash Bargaining versus Market Outcomes*
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper compares the NBS and market outcomes in a simple n-person economy. It shows how the two outcomes differ with respect to responsiveness to differences in risk aversion, endowments, and market positions. JEL Classification: C78 *This research was supported by grants from the UCSC Division of Social Sciences and Academic Senate Committee on Research. I am grateful to Dan Friedman for helpful conversations, and Kai Pommeranke for detailed comments on an earlier draft. I alone am responsible for errors and omissions. **Department of Economics, Social Sciences 1, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064. Phone: (831) 459-4093, Fax: (831) 459-5900, email: [email protected]
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تاریخ انتشار 2002