Some Generalizations of the Manipulability of Fuzzy Social Choice Functions
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper presents some generalizations of the Gibbard -Satterthwaite result (1973, 1975) for fuzzy preference relations. It explores the implication of weakening the transitivity condition of the Ben Abdealziz et al.’s (2008) fuzzy manipulability concept. For this purpose, the max-min transitivity is replaced by weaker transitivity: the max-?-transitivity, where ? is a t-norm. In addition, the best alternative set concept is addressed in two ways. In the first way, it is defined from the t-norm concept. In the second one, it is defined based on the decomposition of fuzzy weak relations in terms of symmetric and regular components. The achieved results can be viewed as more general than the one presented in Ben Abdelaziz et al. (2008) on the strategy-profness of fuzzy social choice functions.
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