Secure implementation in allotment economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
An allocation rule is securely implementable if it is strategy-proof and has no “bad” Nash equilibrium in its associated direct revelation game (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007). We study this implementability notion in allotment economies with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991). The equal division rule and priority rules are characterized on the basis of secure implementability, which underlines a strong trade-off between efficiency and symmetry. Though the uniform rule is not securely implementable, we show that, in its direct revelation game, any “bad” Nash equilibrium is blocked by a credible coalitional deviation, and any “good” Nash equilibrium is never blocked. Thus the impossibility of securely implementing the uniform rule can be resolved by allowing pre-play communication among players.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 68 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010