Online appendix to ‘ The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time ’

The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time

Folk theorems constitute a set of key results in the theory of discrete-time repeated games. These theorems state that the set of equilibrium payoffs expands to the set of all feasible and individually rational payoffs V∗ as players are increasingly patient. A central requirement for the standard folk theorem to hold is that profitable deviations from strategy profiles can be detected. Clearly,...

Supplement to “ The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time ”

Is Full Compliance Possible? Conditions for Shirking with Imperfect Monitoring and Continuous Action Spaces

Games of public good provision, collective action, and collusion share concern for the free rider that shirks on its obligations. According to the folk theorem, the free rider problem can be resolved through punishment mechanisms. Versions of the folk theorem have been applied when monitoring is imperfect. Empirical evidence contradicts this theory: while often subjects cooperate significantly,...

The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

In an irreducible stochastic game, no single player can prevent the stochastic process on states from being irreducible, so the other players can ensure that the current state has little effect on events in the distant future. This paper provides a sufficient condition for the folk theorem in irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring, thus generalizing the folk theorems of D...

Type-Contingent Perfect Public Ex-Post Equilibria∗

We consider repeated games with incomplete information where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions and the map from actions to signal distributions is itself unknown. To do so, we introduce the concept of type-contingent perfect public ex-post equilibrium or T-PPXE, which reduces to the PPXE of Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2009) in complete-information games, and reduces to the bel...