Nonfamily Managers, Family Firms, and the Winner's Curse: The Influence of Noneconomic Goals and Bounded Rationality

نویسندگان

  • James J. Chrisman
  • Esra Memili
  • Kaustav Misra
چکیده

We explain why family-centered noneconomic goals and bounded rationality decrease the willingness and ability of smalland medium-sized family firms to hire and provide competitive compensation to nonfamily managers even in a labor market composed of stewards rather than agents. Family-centered noneconomic goals attenuate the ability to attract high-quality, nonfamily managers by promoting inferior total compensation packages, fewer opportunities for advancement, idiosyncratic strategies, and higher performance expectations. Furthermore, bounded rationality limits nonfamily managers' ability to meet performance expectations when hired. The result is the “winner's curse,” where neither the economic nor noneconomic goals of family owners are fully achieved.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Investigation into Family Traits Impact on Tax Non –compliance of Family Firms (Case Study of Family Firms in Tehran Province)

Tax is one of the effective factors on the decisions and strategies of companies and decision makers in small and medium-sized family firms. The theoretical foundations and empirical evidence indicate that power structures, experiences and culture of family members of these companies can be considered as factors influencing tax aggressiveness. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to e...

متن کامل

The Bounded Rationality Bias in Managerial Valuation of Real Options: Theory and Evidence from IT Projects

Although real options theory normatively suggests that managers should associate such real options with project value, little field research has been conducted to test whether they suffer from systematic biases in doing so. We draw on the notion of bounded rationality in managerial decision making to explore this understudied phenomenon. Using data collected from managers in 88 firms, we show t...

متن کامل

Family Involvement in Ownership and Management: Exploring Nonlinear Effects on Performance

Research on the performance of family firms is growing, but results are mixed, especially for nonlisted companies. Thus, on the basis of the co-presence of benefits and disadvantages of family involvement in ownership and management, we explored the presence of nonlinear effects of these two variables on performance. We run regression analyses on data drawn from 620 privately held family firms ...

متن کامل

Rational Choice Theory: A Cultural Reconsideration

Economists have heralded the formulation of the expected utility theorem as a universal method of choice under uncertainty. In their seminal paper, Stigler and Becker (Stigler & Becker, 1977) declared that “human behavior can be explained by a generalized calculus of utility-maximizing behavior” (p.76). The universality of the rational choice theory has been widely criticized by psychologists, ...

متن کامل

Family Control and Family Firm Valuation by Family CEOs: The Importance of Intentions for Transgenerational Control

Family firms are thought to pursue nonfinancial goals that provide socioemotional wealth, but socioemotional wealth is feasible only with family control of the firm. Using prospect theory, we hypothesize that socioemotional wealth increases with the extent of current control, duration of control, and intentions for transgenerational control, thus adding to the price at which owners would be wil...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015