Shame and Ostracism : Punishing Military Desertion without the Rule of Law

JEL Classification: Z13 Social sanction can substitute for the rule of law, particularly in communities where there are repeat interactions and where there is full information about past actions. The expectation of finacial boycotts or social shunning provides an incentive for reducing malfeasance. We construct a rich micro panel data set of U.S. Civil War soldiers from pro-war and anti-war communities to present new evidence on how community social norms shape soldiers’ post-war experiences. Relative to control groups, deserters were more likely to leave home, moving to anti-war communities, and to re-invent themselves by changing their names. Dora L. Costa MIT Department of Economics, E52-274C 50 Memorial Drive Cambridge, MA 02142 and NBER [email protected] Matthew E. Kahn The Fletcher School Tufts University Medford, MA 02155 [email protected]