Some Remarks on the Relations of Semantic Externalism and Conceptual Pluralism

This article defends the thesis that Putnam’s theory of the use of empirical concepts constitutes a continuous backbone of his philosophy early and late. Thus, Putnam’s theory of empirical concepts should be at least compatible with the most distinctive features of both, his realism (viz., semantic externalism) and his pragmatism (viz., conceptual pluralism). The article suggests the even stronger thesis that Putnam’s theory of concepts is essential for the explanatory purposes of both. In doing so, the article proposes reading Putnam’s theory as a theory displaying contextual features of language use rather than as one describing metaphysical, epistemic, or cognitional ‘underpinnings’. The theory’s continuity is thus taken to show that Putnam’s realism and pragmatism are and always have been inseparable. Putnam’s philosophy is normally divided in two hardly compatible parts: his (early) realism and his (recent) pragmatism. One of the pillars of his early realism, it is agreed, was semantic externalism, whereas one of the pillars of his pragmatism is pluralism in general, and conceptual pluralism in particular. One of the most interesting discussions that has been triggered by Putnam’s change of perspective is if, and to what extent semantic externalism (as a minimal form of realism) and pluralism are compatible. In some of his more recent writings, Putnam stresses that semantic externalism is something he still defends. However, Putnam doesn’t make very clear what function this defence has in his larger, pragmatist perspective that includes conceptual pluralism as well. In order to address this question, I first want to summarise