Reduced form wage equations in the credible bargaining model
نویسندگان
چکیده
We derive an analytical solution for the wage from an alternating-offer wage bargaining game à la Hall and Milgrom (2008) under a plausible parameter restriction. This solution is simple, micro-founded and permits a transparent analysis of the driving forces of wages. We argue that it can be used in a wide range of economic models incorporating the search and matching theory of unemployment to simplify the analysis and obtain more easily interpretable results. JEL Codes : E2, J3, J6.
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تاریخ انتشار 2017