Supplementary appendix to the paper Hierarchical cheap talk Not for publication

نویسندگان

  • Attila Ambrus
  • Eduardo M. Azevedo
  • Yuichiro Kamada
چکیده

Corollary 1: Let k ∈ {2, ..., n−1} and fix the preferences of all players other than k. Let u be a payoff function implying positive (respectively, negative) bias. If v is more positively (resp. negatively) biased than u, then for every pure strategy PBNE of the indirect communication game in which player k’s payoff function is v, there is an outcome-equivalent pure-strategy PBNE of the indirect communication game in which player k’s payoff function is u.

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تاریخ انتشار 2011