General revealed preference theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as preferences) are observable, then we can obtain a universal axiomatization purely on observables. The result “explains” classical revealed preference theory, as applied to individual rational choice. We obtain new applications to Nash equilibrium theory and Pareto optimal choice.
منابع مشابه
Forthcoming in Theoretical Economics. GENERAL REVEALED PREFERENCE THEORY
We generalize the standard revealed-preference exercise in economics, and prove a sufficient condition under which the revealed-preference formulation of an economic theory has universal implications, and when these implications can be recursively enumerated. We apply our theorem to two theories of group behavior: the theory of group preference and of Nash equilibrium.
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As mentioned in the Introduction, it has the following goals: to develop the main topics of revealed preference theory (rationality, revealed preference, congruence, consistency) for a large class of fuzzy choice functions, to explore new topics (degree of dominance, similarity, indicators of rationality) specific to a fuzzy approach to choice functions and to show the manner in which some prob...
متن کاملDivision of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 General Revealed Preference Theory
We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as preferences) are observable, then we can obtain a universal axiomatization purely on observables. The result “explains” classical revealed preference th...
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تاریخ انتشار 2010