Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games
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چکیده
Introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that they and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This clarifies some misunderstandings (in regard to invariance and randomness), sometimes found in the Nash program. 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.
منابع مشابه
Fifty years of the Nash program , 1953 - 2003
This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C71, C72, C78.
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تاریخ انتشار 1998