Cake Cutting: Equitable Simple Allocations of Heterogeneous Goods
نویسنده
چکیده
Cake cutting, a subfield of fair division, refers to the allocation of a heterogeneous, divisible, and continuous good among n players who have heterogeneous preferences. The challenge is to allocate the cake in such a way that is fair by using a procedure that encourages the players to be truthful about their preferences. There are several different notions of fairness studied in the literature; in this essay, we consider equitability – a fairness criteria where each player gets the same proportion of the cake as she values it. We give a comprehensive survey of prominent results for equitable allocations using n− 1 cuts. We also focus on the relationship between equitability and other fairness criterion and note when it is possible to have procedures that are simultaneously equitable and proportional or envy-free.
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تاریخ انتشار 2015