Effectiveness of Probability Perception Modeling and Defender Strategy Generation Algorithms in Repeated Stackelberg Games: An Initial Report

نویسندگان

  • Debarun Kar
  • Fei Fang
  • Francesco Maria Delle Fave
  • Nicole Sintov
  • Milind Tambe
  • Arlette van Wissen
چکیده

While human behavior models based on repeated Stackelberg games have been proposed for domains such as “wildlife crime” where there is repeated interaction between the defender and the adversary, there has been no empirical study with human subjects to show the effectiveness of such models. This paper presents an initial study based on extensive human subject experiments with participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Our findings include: (i) attackers may view the defender’s coverage probability in a non-linear fashion; specifically it follows an S-shaped curve, and (ii) there are significant losses in defender utility when strategies generated by existing models are deployed in repeated Stackelberg game settings against human subjects.

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تاریخ انتشار 2015