Towards a Belief-Based Theory of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: An Application of POMDP∗
نویسنده
چکیده
An equilibrium in a repeated game with imperfect private moitoring is called a finite state equilibrium, if each player’s action on the equilibrium path is given by an automaton with a finite number of states. We provide a tractable general method to check the equilibrium conditions in this class. Our method is based on the belief-based approach and employs the theory of POMDP (Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes). This encompasses the majority of existing works.
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تاریخ انتشار 2010