Diderik Batens CRITERIA CAUSING INCONSISTENCIES. GENERAL GLUTS AS OPPOSED TO NEGATION GLUTS

نویسنده

  • Diderik Batens
چکیده

This paper studies the question: How should one handle inconsistencies that derive from the inadequacy of the criteria by which one approaches the world. I compare several approaches. The adaptive logics defined from CLuN appear to be superior to the others in this respect. They isolate inconsistencies rather than spreading them, and at the same time allow for genuine deductive steps from inconsistent and mutually inconsistent premises. Yet, the systems based on CLuN seem to introduce an asymmetry between negated and non-negated formulas, and this seems hard to justify. To clarify and understand the source of the asymmetry, the epistemological presuppositions of CLuN, viz. inadequate criteria, are investigated. This leads to a new type of paraconsistent logic that involves gluts with respect to all logical symbols. The larger part of the paper is devoted to this logic, to the adaptive logics defined from it, and to the properties of these systems. While the resulting logics are sensible and display interesting features, the search for variants of the justification leads to an unexpected justification for CLuN.

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تاریخ انتشار 2005