A note on Peters and Severinov, "Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices"
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 55 (1988), 71 84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (Econometrica 61 (1993), 1281 1312) in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D41, D44, D82. 1997 Academic Press
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 147 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012