Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation
نویسنده
چکیده
I consider cooperation situations where players have network relations. Networks evolve according to a stationary transition probability matrix and at each moment in time players receive payoffs from a stationary allocation rule. Players discount the future by a common factor. The pair formed by an allocation rule and a transition probability matrix is called expected fair if for every link in the network both participants gain, marginally, and in discounted, expected terms, the same from it; and it is called a pairwise network formation procedure if the probability that a link is created (or eliminated) is positive if the discounted, expected gains to its two participants are positive too. The main result is the existence, for the discount factor small enough, of an expected fair and pairwise network formation procedure where the allocation rule is component balanced, meaning it distributes the total value of any maximal connected subnetwork among its participants. This existence result holds for all discount factors when the pairwise network formation procedure is restricted. I finally provide some comparison with previous models of farsighted network formation.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 43 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014