Influence of deontological versus consequentialist orientations on act choices and framing effects: when principles are more important than consequences

A long tradition in decision making assumes that people usually take a consequentialist perspective, which implies a focus on the outcomes only when making decisions. Such a view largely neglects the existence of a deontological perspective, which implies that people are sensitive to moral duties that require or prohibit certain behaviors, irrespective of the consequences. Similarly, recent research has also suggested that people holding ‘‘protected values’’ (PVs) show increased attention to acts versus omissions and less attention to outcomes. The present research investigates the role of deontological versus consequentialist modes of thought and of PVs on framing effects and act versus omission choices. In a modification of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) risky choice framing paradigm, we manipulated the framing of the outcomes (positive, negative), as well as whether the certain outcome was associated with an act or inaction. The main results suggest that act versus omission tendencies are linked to deontological focus and PVs. Framing effects, on the other hand, are driven by a consequentialist focus. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. The lion’s share of research on judgment and decision making has focused on secular goods such as consumer choices or monetary payoffs. There is, however, a growing body of evidence concerning the moral aspects of choice, particularly for the case of tradeoffs. For instance, many people think that it is morally wrong to assign a monetary value to human lives or to have a free market in body parts or a futures market betting on terrorist acts. Recently, terms such as protected values (PVs) (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Ritov & Baron, 1999), sacred values (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000), or taboo values (Lichtenstein, Gregory & Irwin, 2007) have been developed to express the idea that some values are thought of as absolute and protected from tradeoffs with other values, particularly secular values (e.g., economic benefits). A person who engages in or contemplates making such tradeoffs may trigger moral outrage in others and may induce both harsh reactions toward and intention to punish the violator (Tetlock et al., 2000). In addition, people may also be highly motivated to engage in activities that protect these values from threat and violation (Skitka, 2002). There is also general agreement that these moral values have an impact on information processing and have an influence on what aspects of a decision people deem to be relevant (e.g., Baron & Spranca, 1997; Ritov & Baron, 1999). Perhaps the most striking contrast is between deontological and consequentialist perspectives on decisions. The focal point of deontology is the concept of duty; deontology is derived from the Greek word deon (duty). Duties are morally mandated actions or prohibitions, such as the duty to keep promises or the duty not to lie (Broad, 1930). The distinctive idea of deontological approaches is that the morality of a behavior is assessed by application of a rule or principle that requires or prohibits certain behaviors. It is the nature of the act per se in which moral rightness or wrongness resides (e.g., ‘‘I did it because it was the right thing to do.’’). Consequences per se are at best secondary. The most influential deontological moral theory has been that advanced by Kant (1797), who introduced the idea of the categorical imperative. nt of Psychology, University of Zurich, Binzmuehlestrasse 14/18, 8050 Zurich, Switzerland. s, Ltd. Received 11 April 2007 Accepted 13 November 2007 Carmen Tanner et al. Deontological theories of morality are usually contrasted with consequentialism (e.g., Anscombe, 1958; Birnbacher, 2003; Broad, 1930). A long tradition in decision making assumes that people’s decisions are aimed at maximizing some benefit function, without being affected by rules or factors external to outcomes. In consequentialist analyses, conclusions about what is right or wrong are based on the consequences. Although there is nothing inherent in consequentialism that precludes its application to moral decision making, previous work suggests that sacred or PVs are often linked with deontological decision rules (e.g., Baron & Spranca, 1997). The present work explores the cognitive consequences of deontological versus consequentialist orientations for framing effects. A secondary goal is to explicitly examine the relationship between PVs and deontology and the relation between PVs and framing effects. In the next few paragraphs, we briefly review framing effects and then turn to the relationship between deontological and consequentialist orientations.