Bid or Buy? Individual Shopping Traits as Predictors of Strategic Exit in On-Line Auctions

نویسندگان

  • Corey M. Angst
  • Ritu Agarwal
  • Jason Kuruzovich
چکیده

this paper examines the behavioral aspects of bidder conduct in on-line auctions. It utilizes price data from 113 on-line auctions, surveys of winning bidders, and draws upon the consumer behavior and auction’s literature to examine individual trait differences in shopping preferences that predict a buyer’s decision to use “strategic exit,” the fixed-price buy-it-Now (bIN) functionality. It argues that impulse-buying tendencies, trait competitiveness, and hedonic need fulfillment are antecedents of strategic exit, and that hedonic need fulfillment moderates the effect of impulse-buying tendencies on strategic exit. buyers who exit an auction early by using the bIN feature end up paying a higher than average price. theoretical and practical implications for the design of electronic auctions and the process of selling goods are offered.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Int. J. Electronic Commerce

دوره 13  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008