Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Uncertainty
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چکیده
We apply the aggregation property of Identical Shape Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (ISHARA) utility functions to analyze the comparative statics properties of a bargaining model with uncertainty. We identify sufficient and necessary conditions under which an increase in one’s degree of risk aversion benefits/hurts one’s opponent. We apply our model to analyze the problems of bargaining over insurance contracts and bargaining over incentive contracts.
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تاریخ انتشار 2013