Security-aware register placement to hinder malicious hardware updating and improve Trojan detectability

Security Against Hardware Trojan Attacks Using Key-Based Design Obfuscation

Malicious modification of hardware in untrusted fabrication facilities, referred to as hardware Trojan, has emerged as a major security concern. Comprehensive detection of these Trojans during postmanufacturing test has been shown to be extremely difficult. Hence, it is important to develop design techniques that provide effective countermeasures against hardware Trojans by either preventing Tr...

Hardware Trojan Identification and Detection

The majority of techniques developed to detect hardware trojans are based on specific attributes. Further, the ad hoc approaches employed to design methods for trojan detection are largely ineffective. Hardware trojans have a number of attributes which can be used to systematically develop detection techniques. Based on this concept, a detailed examination of current trojan detection techniques...

A Power Aware Cache and Register File Design Space Exploration

Hardware Trojan vulnerability

Many basic analog blocks and structures, which contain positive feedback loops, are vulnerable to the presence of one or more undesired stable equilibrium points. The phenomena of multiple equilibrium points is investigated with emphasis on using a temperature-domain representation to identify equilibrium points in some circuits that have a single positive feedback loop. By example, it is shown...

A Hardware Trojan Detection Framework

In the recent years, hardware trojans have become a serious issue in the field of integrated circuits. Our work presents a framework for hardware trojan detection in wireless cryptographic integrated circuits. It deals with the leaking of secret information through a wireless communication, using a mixed-signal integrated circuit technique. A trojan is inserted in the introduced system, which d...

Designing and Implementing Malicious Hardware

Hidden malicious circuits provide an attacker with a stealthy attack vector. As they occupy a layer below the entire software stack, malicious circuits can bypass traditional defensive techniques. Yet current work on trojan circuits considers only simple attacks against the hardware itself, and straightforward defenses. More complex designs that attack the software are unexplored, as are the co...