We consider a state-dependent multiaccess channel (MAC) with state non-causally known to some encoders. For simplicity of exposition, we focus on a two-encoder model in which one of the encoders has non-causal access to the channel state. The results can in principle be extended to any number of encoders with a subset of them being informed. We derive an inner bound for the capacity region in t...

Can subjects avoid creating false memories as outlined in Roediger and McDermott's (1995) false recognition paradigm if they are forewarned about this memory illusion? We presented subjects with semantically related word lists, followed by a recognition test. The test was composed of studied words, semantically related nonstudied words (critical lures), and unrelated nonstudied words. One group...

Skilled investors make money off uninformed investors. By acting as intermediaries, they provide a hedge to the uninformed investors themselves. I present a model in which households have imperfect information about expected returns. Non-traded income shocks lead them to rebalance, sometimes at the wrong time. Active funds hedge this risk by trading on superior information. In equilibrium, they...

This paper studies the reputation effect in which a long-lived player faces a sequence of uninformed short-lived players and the uninformed players receive informative but noisy exogenous signals about the type of the long-lived player. We provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the longlived player. The lower bound shows when the exogenous signals are sufficiently no...

We study how the imposition of a redemption fee affects runs on financial institutions when investors are asymmetrically informed about fundamentals. Although the fee eliminates the first-mover advantage by internalizing the payoff externality and, therefore, discourages runs by informed investors, it also alters the information externality by influencing uninformed investors’ learning and may,...

Honeybees swarm when they move to a new site for their hive. During the process of swarming, their behavior can be analyzed by classifying them as informed bees or uninformed bees, where the informed bees have some information about the destination while the uninformed bees follow the informed bees. The swarm’s movement can be viewed as a network of mobile nodes with asymmetric information exch...