We model a real-world case problem as a price competition model between two leader-follower supply chains that each of them consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. T he manufacturer produces partially differentiated products and sells to market through his retailer. The retailer sells the products of manufacturer to market by adding some values to the product and gains margin as a fracti...

In this study, the implications of the government’s tariffs on optimal pricing decisions in a dual-channel SC with one manufacturer and one retailer by taking into account the retailer services are examined. First, the best response strategies of retailer and manufacturer have obtained following the government’s tariffs by using a Stackelberg game model. Then, the government problem has modeled...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of a mixed equilibrium. We compare the predictions in various classes of evolutionary and learning proc...

This work consider the problem of flow control using incentive strategy in Stackelberg game theory. The network model employed here is that users route their flows from a common source to a common destination node, each of them trying to optimize its individual performance objective. First, the existing Stackelberg routing strategy is briefly introduced. And then, the linear Stackelberg incenti...

The hierarchical interaction between the actor and critic in actor-critic based reinforcement learning algorithms naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic interpretation. We adopt this viewpoint model as two-player general-sum game with leader-follower structure known Stackelberg game. Given abstraction, we propose meta-framework for where leader player follows total derivative of its objecti...

The paper technically proposes a newly secure scheme for simultaneous wireless power and information transfer (SWIPT) frameworks. We take into account an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)-based game which is in relation to a multi-input multi-output multi-antenna Eavesdropper (MIMOME) strategy. The transceiver is generally able to witness the case imperfect channel state informa...

Stackelberg game models have recently seen considerable practical and academic success in security applications, with defender as the leader, and attacker the follower. The key conceptual insight of Stackelberg security games is that defense needs to be proactive, optimally accounting for attacker’s response to a defensive posture. We propose that this insight has relevance in another important...

Simultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) equilibria of two-player dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under a perfect Bayesian formulation. For the dynamic scalar cheap talk, a zero-delay communication setup is considered for i.i.d. and Markov sources; it is shown that the final stage equilibrium is always quantized and under further restrictive con...

Design of complex engineered systems often involves optimization of multiple competing problems that are supposed to compromise to arrive at equilibrium optima, entailing a joint optimization problem. This paper reveals the leader-follower decision structure inherent in joint optimization problems. A Stackelberg game solution is formulated to model a leader-follower joint optimization problem a...