نتایج جستجو برای: coalition proofness
تعداد نتایج: 7616 فیلتر نتایج به سال:
In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in the coalition then the coalition itself is also feasible. The union stable structures, which constit...
IN THIS PAPER WE SEARCH for solutions to various classes of allocation problems. We Ž require them to be Pareto efficient and indi idually rational in the sense that no agent is . ever worse off than he would be on his own . In addition to these minimal requirements we also would like agents not to be able to profitably misrepresent their preferences. This property is known as strategy-proofnes...
It is shown that simple and coalitional strategy-proofness of a voting rule on the full unimodal domain of a convex idempotent interval space (X, I) are equivalent properties if (X, I) satisfies interval anti-exchange, a basic property also shared by a large class of convex geometries including -but not reducing totrees and linear geometries. Therefore, strategy-proof location problems in a vas...
We consider the problem of coordinating the exchange of real-time information among multiple agents. For example, a US Department of Transportation pilot program seeks to reduce tra c accidents by allowing each vehicle to request and send crash-relevant information (e.g. position, speed, braking status) from and to neighboring vehicles. Time is of the essence: vehicle information becomes stale ...
We show that, when the number of participating agents n tends to infinity, all classical social choice rules are asymptotically strategy-proof with the proportion of manipulable profiles being of order O (1/ √ n). Running title: On asymptotic strategy-proofness.
We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set agents with strict preferences. show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening first requirement to q-unanimity – i.e., when every agent ranks different object at top, then each shall receive his most-preferred probability least q we satisfying strategy-proofness, envy-freeness ex-...
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