«coalition proofness»
۳۰۱ نتیجهCoalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities*
The ability of the members of a coalition to communicate secretly determines whether the coalition can coordinate to deviate from a proposed strategy and thus affects which strategies are ‘‘coalition proof.’’ We show that the existence of a Pareto-best element in the set of strat
Coalition - Proof Supply Function Equilibria under Capacity Constraints
Whereas in the absence of capacity constraints the Cournot outcome is the unique coalition-proof supply function equilibrium outcome, the presence of capacity constraints may enlarge the set of equilibrium outcomes. Interestingly, if capacities are sufficiently asymmetric the new
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in a Normal-Form Game and its Subgames
The relationship between coalition-proof equilibria in a normal-form game and those in its subgame is examined. A subgame of a normal-form game is a game in which the strategy sets of all players in the subgame are subsets of those in the normal-form game. Ray (2001) proved that
Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in a public good mechanism and study which Nash equilibria are achieved through the cooperative behavior of agents. The participation game may have multiple Nash equilibria, and various numbers of participants may
Designing Coalition-Proof Mechanisms for Auctions over Continuous Goods
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. Our analysis seeks to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the au
Coalition-proofness and Dominance Relations
This paper examines the relationship between coalition-proof Nash equilibria based on different dominance relations. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999) pointed out that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination does not necessarily coincide with that unde
Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
We consider a barter market with multiple types of indivisible goods. Konishi et al. [J. Math. Econ. 35 (2001) 1–15] showed that the core of this market may be empty. We define a normal form game for this market and consider its equilibrium outcomes. Assuming separable strict pre
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria and the Core in Three-Player Games
We study 3-person noncooperative games of coalition formation where the underlying situation is represented by a game in coalitional form without side payments. We look at coalition-proof Nash equilibria and we show that if the underlying game is balanced (in the sense of Scarf),
Coalition-proof stable networks
Abstract We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed. A network is stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible deviation. said to have deviation profitable some and subcoalition deviat
Exploiting Weak Supermodularity for Coalition-Proof Mechanisms
Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, coalitions of participants can influence the auction outcome to obtain higher collective profit. These manipulations were proven to be eliminated if and only if the market objective is supermodular. Nevertheless, sev