ویراساینس.
مقاله‌ی دسترسی آزاد

Coalition-proof stable networks

['Chenghong Luo', 'Ana Mauleon', 'Vincent Vannetelbosch', '']

چکیده

Abstract We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed. A network is stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible deviation. said to have deviation profitable some and subcoalition deviating players subsequent Coalition-proof coarsening strong stability. emphasize importance by considering four models where strongly fails exist while does exist. provide an easy verify condition existence may not There relationship between set induced Nash equilibrium Myerson’s linking game.

اسناد مشابه

  • Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in a Normal-Form Game and its Subgames

    سند علمی۲۰۱۰IGTRRyusuke Shinohara

    The relationship between coalition-proof equilibria in a normal-form game and those in its subgame is examined. A subgame of a normal-form game is a game in which the strategy sets of all players in the subgame are subsets of those in the normal-form game. Ray (2001) proved that

  • Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game

    سند علمی۲۰۱۰Int. J. Game TheoryRyusuke Shinohara

    We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in a public good mechanism and study which Nash equilibria are achieved through the cooperative behavior of agents. The participation game may have multiple Nash equilibria, and various numbers of participants may

  • Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities*

    سند علمی۱۹۹۶Paul Milgrom, John Roberts

    The ability of the members of a coalition to communicate secretly determines whether the coalition can coordinate to deviate from a proposed strategy and thus affects which strategies are ‘‘coalition proof.’’ We show that the existence of a Pareto-best element in the set of strat

  • Designing Coalition-Proof Mechanisms for Auctions over Continuous Goods

    سند علمی۲۰۱۷Orcun Karaca, Pier Giuseppe Sessa, Neil Walton, Maryam Kamgarpour

    This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. Our analysis seeks to design the payment rules and conditions under which coalitions of participants cannot influence the au

  • Coalition-proofness and Dominance Relations

    سند علمی۲۰۱۶Ryusuke Shinohara

    This paper examines the relationship between coalition-proof Nash equilibria based on different dominance relations. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999) pointed out that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination does not necessarily coincide with that unde

  • Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods

    سند علمی۲۰۰۵Mathematical Social SciencesJun Wako

    We consider a barter market with multiple types of indivisible goods. Konishi et al. [J. Math. Econ. 35 (2001) 1–15] showed that the core of this market may be empty. We define a normal form game for this market and consider its equilibrium outcomes. Assuming separable strict pre