This paper provides a new life cycle model that takes into account key elements of bounded rationality. The paper shows that the model can account for patterns in the data that are hard to explain by the standard life cycle model. Among other patterns, the model predicts that, typically, the young either hold no equity or their equity portfolio share is rather low and then increases over workin...

Recall that our goal is to prove the rationality of the zeta function of an algebraic variety X over Fq. As we have seen in Lecture 3, in order to prove this in general, it is enough to prove it in the case when X is a hypersurface in AdFq , defined by some f ∈ Fq[x1, . . . , xd]. Furthermore, an easy argument based an induction and on the inclusionexclusion principle, will allow us to reduce o...

Using an argument based on an idea of Monsky, we prove the rationality of the F-pure thresholds of curve singularities on a smooth surface defined over a finite field. More generally, we prove in this setting the rationality and discreteness of F-jumping exponents, the smallest positive one of which is the F-pure threshold. We also give a lower bound for F-pure thresholds in the homogeneous case.

In 1995, Aumann proved that in games of perfect information, common knowledge of rationality yields backward induction. In 1998, Stalnaker provided an example of a game in which common knowledge of rationality, once belief revision is taken into account, does not yield backward induction. However, in some pertinent situations in this example, players are allowed to forfeit the rationality condi...

This paper examines the shareholder wealth effects associated with global equity offerings made by foreign firms after their initial cross listing in the United States. We document that the market reaction to seasoned global equity offerings is economically and statistically insignificant. However, it is 1.5 percent larger than the market reaction to offerings made on local exchanges only. In a...

This paper examines the problem of aggregating infinite utility streams with a social welfare function that respects the Hammond Equity and Weak Pareto Axioms. The paper provides a complete characterization of domains (of the one period utilities) on which such an aggregation is possible. A social welfare function satisfying the Hammond Equity and Weak Pareto Axioms exists on precisely those do...

In 1995, Aumann proved that in games of perfect information, common knowledge of rationality yields backward induction. In 1998, Stalnaker provided an example of a game in which common knowledge of rationality, once belief revision is taken into account, does not yield backward induction. However, in some pertinent situations in this example, players are allowed to forfeit the rationality condi...