The neglect syndrome has been defined as a failure to report, respond or orient to novel or meaningful stimuli presented to the side opposite of a brain lesion when this failure can not be attributed to elemental sensory (e.g., hemianopia) or motor (hemiplegia) deficits. This failure to report, respond or orient can be induced by attentional, representation-memory, and intentional deficits. The...

Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional sta...

Title of Dissertation: THE EXPLANATORY ROLE OF INTENTIONAL CONTENT IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE Andrew Charles Knoll, Doctor of Philosophy, 2015 Dissertation directed by: Professor Georges Rey, Department of Philosophy This work argues that intentional content plays at least two explanatory roles in cognitive science. First, it allows cognitive states to be type-individuated independently of their rela...

In this paper we investigate traffic-engineering issues in Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) alloptical networks. In such networks, the wavelength continuity constraint along with the wavelength clash constraint, lead to poor network performances when dealing with the lightpath provisioning problem. The impact of these constraints is especially severe when traffic demands are unpredictable...

Deliberate control of an entertainment robot presents a special problem in balancing the requirement for intentional behavior with the existing mechanisms for autonomous action selection. We propose that the intentional biasing of activation in lower-level reactive behaviors is the proper mechanism for realizing such deliberative action. In addition, we suggest that directed intentional bias ca...

I assume in this paper that the proposition “I cannot know your intentional states” is true. I consider its consequences on the use of so-called “intentional concepts” for Requirements Engineering. I argue that if you take this proposition to be true, then intentional concepts (e.g., goal, belief, desire, intention, etc.) start to look less relevant (though not irrelevant), despite being the fo...

Recent experimental research on the ‘Knobe effect’ suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that there is a bi-directional relation between attributions of intentional action and evaluative considerations. We defend a novel account of this phenomenon that exploits two factors: (i) an intuitive asymmetry in judgments of responsibility (e.g., praise/blame) and (ii) the fact that intentionality commonly c...