In this paper we provide a micro model of loans which the lender is a monopolistic bank and the borrower is a competitive consumer with consumption habits who may default on part of his debt. In this setting, we prove that the loan demand curve is kinked and therefore it is possible to find interest rate rigidity in equilibrium as well as asymmetric response of loans to interest rate variations...

VAR analysis on a measure of bank lending standards collected by the Federal Reserve reveals that shocks to lending standards are significantly correlated with innovations in commercial loans at banks and in real output. Credit standards strongly dominate loan rates in explaining variation in business loans and output. Standards remain significant when we include various proxies for loan demand...

We consider a model in which banks face two moral hazard problems: 1) asset substitution by shareholders, which can occur when banks make socially-inefficient, risky loans; and 2) managerial under-provision of effort in loan monitoring. The privately-optimal level of bank leverage is neither too low nor too high: It efficiently balances the market discipline that owners of risky debt impose on ...

We investigate how bank competition a ects the e ciency of credit allocation, using a model of spatial competition. Our analysis shows that bad loans are more likely the larger the number of banks competing for customers. We study further how many banks will be active if market entry is not regulated. Free entry can induce too much entry and thus too many bad loans compared to the social optimu...

Abstract A long-standing macroeconomic issue is how monetary policy affects the real economy. The lending view is that tight money affects aggregate demand by shifting the supply schedule left in the bank loan market. Previous studies have found that loans contract following tight money. It is not clear whether the financial contraction reflects a shift of the supply schedule or the demand sche...

Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System. The author thanks Eric Rosengren, Joe Peek, Ralph Kimball, and Lynn Browne for helpful comments. Valuable research assistance was provided by Kevin Daly. Problem Loans at New England Ban...

One important characteristic of the recent mortgage crisis is the prevalence of subprime mortgages with adjustable interest rates and their high default rates. In this paper, we build and estimate a dynamic structural model of adjustable-rate mortgage defaults using unique mortgage loan level data. The data contain detailed information not only on borrowers’ mortgage payment history and lender ...

This paper studies bank loans over the business cycles in Iran to determine the role of Iranian banks in stabilizing credit. By estimating the long-run relations using dynamic OLS and fully modified OLS estimators, the findings show that real bank lending is positively related to real GDP in the long-run providing evidences of the pro-cyclicality of bank lending in Iran. Hence, Iranian banking ...

We study a transitional economy where state-controlled banks make loan decisions based on noisy inside information on prospective borrowers, and may lend to avert unemployment and social instability. In China, poor financial performance and high managerial expenses increase the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan, and bank loan approval predicts poor subsequent borrower performance. Negative ev...