This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems where the underlying economic opportunities are described by a partition function. This classic bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional o¤ers, and coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from trade. The theory y...

In this study, a model is presented for allocating cloud computing resources based on economic considerations using tools from game theory. The model, called the Non-Cooperative Game Resource Allocation Algorithm (NCGRAA), designed to achieve optimum stage in computing. addition, Bargaining (BGRAA) introduced existing system develop billing process within constraints of availability and fairnes...

Of John Nash’s two contributions to game theory, it is the concept of the equilibrium point that has been assessed as quintessential to economics.1 This can be attributed to the fact that it exemplifi es the dominant view among economists that the maximization postulate and the assumptions of perfect rationality and complete information have both normative and descriptive value. This reasoning,...

We compare alternating-offer and demand bargaining models of the legislative bargaining process. These two approaches make very different predictions in terms of both ex-ante and ex-post distribution of payoffs, as well as about the role of the order of play. Experiments show that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical predictions. We...

We compare the bargaining power of the patentee under American and English rules of legal costs allocation. Using the Nash Bargaining Game framework, we show that litigation can be a Pareto efficient outcome. The cooperative game framework allows us to examine how the institutional and market factors influence bargaining powers of plaintiff and defendant under different rules of legal cost allo...

The Network Formation problem has received increasing attention in recent years. Previous works have addressed this problem considering only networks designed by sel sh users, which can be consistently suboptimal. This paper addresses the network formation issue using cooperative game theory, which permits to study ways to enforce and sustain cooperation among agents. Both the Nash bargaining s...

In this paper, we apply an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) to solve the Rubinstein’s Basic AlternatingOffer Bargaining Problem, and compare our experimental results with its analytic game-theoretic solution. The application of EA employs an alternative set of assumptions on the players’ behaviors. Experimental outcomes suggest that the applied co-evolutionary algorithm, one of Evolutionary Algorith...

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the direct conflict We are thankful to Salvador Barberà, Jordi Brandts, Yeon-Koo Che, Joe Harrington, Carmen Herrero, Dan Kovenock, R. Vijay Krishna, Marco Mariotti, Rich McLean, Clara Ponsatí, Debraj Ray and especially to Andreu Mas-Colell, as well as to semina...

We study a bargaining game in which a player needs to pay a fixed cost in the beginning of every period t, if he wants to stay in the game in period t + 1, in case a deal has not been reached by the end of t. Whether a player pays this cost is his private information. Every efficient payoff vector can be approximated in equilibrium. When costs of delay vanish, the value of every symmetric stati...