This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in a model of price-setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity, and demand is continuous and decreasing. In general there is a unique equilibrium, so that comparative static exercises are meaningful. The properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts. The equilibrium prices are lower, the smaller is demand r...

Motivated by analyzing the dynamic adjustment process of players in an n-player Cournot game, in this paper a discrete-time quadratic dynamical system is proposed and the stability of its equilibrium is analyzed. Several output adjustment mechanisms (e.g. best reply, adaptive adjustment and myopic) and expectations (e.g. naïve and adaptive) in a Cournot game with linear price function and quadr...

Oligopolies in which firms have different costs of production have been relatively understudied. In contrast to models with symmetric costs, some firms may be inactive in equilibrium. (With symmetric costs, the results trivialize to all firms active or all firms inactive.) We concentrate on the linear demand structure with constant marginal but asymmetric costs. In static one-period models, we ...

The behaviour of firms on an oligopolistic market is usually modeled via the CournotNash equilibrium concept ([13, 18]). In fact, it is the classical Nash equilibrium, where each player (firm) maximizes its profit subject to production constraints. Assuming that one from the firms has a temporal advantage over the others, this firm can increase its profit by replacing a Cournot-Nash strategy by...

For games with a measure space of players a tandem pair, consisting of a mixed and a pure Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence result, is presented. Their generality causes them to be completely mutually equivalent. This provides a unifying pair of Cournot–Nash existence results that goes considerably beyond the central result of E. J. Balder (1995, Int. J. Game Theory 24, 79–94, Theorem 2.1). Th...

This paper demonstrates the quantization of a spatial Cournot duopoly model with product choice, a two stage game focusing on non-cooperation in locations and quantities. With quantization, the players can access a continuous set of strategies, using continuous variable quantum mechanical approach. The presence of quantum entanglement in the initial state identifies a quantity equilibrium for e...

The stabilization of the Cournot equilibrium point of a duopoly by feedback control is analyzed. We give a general result which is valid for any duopoly controlled by linear feedback and study in detail the stabilization of a duopoly when the feedback is not linear.

Complex nonlinear economic dynamics in a Cournot duopoly model proposed by M. Kopel is studied in detail in this work. By utilizing the topological horseshoe theory proposed by Yang XS, the authors detect the topological horseshoe chaotic dynamics in the Cournot duopoly model for the first time, and also give the rigorous computer-assisted verification for the existence of horseshoe. In the pro...