The architecture of social and economic networks is often explained in terms of the externalities shaping the link-forming incentives of players. We make two contributions to this literature. First, we bring into its ambit the linear-quadratic utility model. Since players’ utilities are now a function of their network centralities, this permits endogenizing their locational incentives in a netw...

Most allocation rules for network games presented in the literature assume that the network structure is fixed. We put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic. Time-series of networks are studied that describe processes of network formation where links may appear or disappear at any period....

It is common to de…ne a network organization as one that is fast and ‡exible in adapting to changes in the underlying environment. But besides the short-run advantages of adaptability, fast changes in the structure of the organization can also be detrimental in the longer run. This happens because a widespread knowledge of the organization’s structure is important in channelling (and thus speed...

We develop a theory of ‘behavioral communities’ and the ‘atomic structure’ of networks. We define atoms to be groups of agents whose behaviors always match each other in a set of coordination games played on the network. This provides a microfoundation for a method of detecting communities in social and economic networks. We provide theoretical results characterizing such behavior-based communi...

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target ca...

Social Interactions and Labor Market Outcomes in Cities We develop a model where information about jobs is essentially obtained through friends and relatives, i.e. strong and weak ties. Workers commute to a business center to work and to interact with other people. We find that housing prices increase with the level of social interactions in the city because information about jobs is transmitte...

The paper attempts to develop a suitable accessibility index for networks where each link has a value such that a smaller number is preferred like distance, cost, or travel time. A measure called distance sum is characterized by three independent properties: anonymity, an appropriately chosen independence axiom, and dominance preservation, which requires that a node not far to any other is at l...

This paper addresses the existence of Nash networks for the one-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000) in a number of different settings. First, we provide conditions for the existence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogenous and players obtain resources from others only through the directed path between them. We find that costs of establishing links play a v...

We consider an agent-based model of financial markets with asynchronous order arrival in continuous time. Buying and seeling orders arrive in accordance with a Poisson dynamics where the order rates depend both on past prices and the mood of the market. The agents form their demand for an asset on the basis of their forecasts of future prices and where their forecasting rules may change over ti...