We address the classical uniformly related machine scheduling problem with minsum objective. The problem is solvable in polynomial time by the algorithm of Horowitz and Sahni. In that solution, each machine sequences its jobs shortest first. However when jobs may choose the machine on which they are processed, while keeping the same sequencing rule per machine, the resulting Nash equilibria are...

We explore to what extent we can propose …xed negotiation rules as well as simple mechanisms (or protocols) that guarantee that political parties can form stable coalition-governments. We analyze the case where three parties can hold o¢ ce in the form of two-party coalitions. We de…ne the family of Weighted Rules, that select political agreements as a function of the bliss-points of the parties...

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule “imitate the best.” In a redistribution game with utilitarian gov...

We study the complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in voting games over well-known restricted preference domains, such as the domains of single-peaked and single-crossing preferences. We focus on the Plurality rule, and, following the recent work of Elkind et al. [15], consider three popular tie-breaking rules (lexicographic, random-candidate, and random-voter) and two types of voters’ att...

Search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on Nash (1950) bargaining, or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome, to determine the terms of trade. By considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a simple search model with divisible money, we show how this choice matters for important results such as the ability of the optimal monetary policy to generate an ef...

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule “imitate the best.” In a redistribution game with utilitarian gov...

We present a model of multi-party, “spatial” competition under proportional rule with both electoral and coalitional risk. Each party consists of a set of delegates with heterogeneous policy preferences. These delegates choose one delegate as leader or agent. This agent announces the policy declaration (or manifesto) to the electorate prior to the election. The choice of the agent by each party...

In this paper, we study two multiagent variants of the knapsack problem. Fluschnik et al. [AAAI 2019] studied model in which each agent expresses its preference by assigning a utility to every item. They three aggregation rules for finding subset (knapsack) items: individually best, diverse, and Nash welfare-based. Informally, diversity is achieved satisfying as many agents possible. Motivated ...

Search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on Nash (1950) bargaining, or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome, to determine the terms of trade. By considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a simple search model with divisible money, we show how this choice matters for important results such as the ability of the optimal monetary policy to generate an ef...

We study many-to-one matching problems when each firm has substitutable and separable preferences. We analyze the stochastic dominance (sd) Nash equilibria of the game induced by any probabilistic stable matching rule. We show that a unique match is obtained as the outcome of each sd-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, individual rationality with respect to the true preferences is a necessary and su...