in iran’s system of tripartite collective bargaining, does the wage-policy maker consistently react optimally to the best move made by the exchange rate-policy maker (nash-rule) or only to the state of economy (non-nash rule)?. this paper not only investigates the nature of the political game (nash rule against non-nash rule) but also estimates some structural parameters by using 2sls method an...

An allocation rule is called Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, if there exists a payment rule, such that truthful reports of agents’ types form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the direct revelation mechanism consisting of the allocation rule and the payment rule. This paper provides a characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules in social choice settings where agents have mul...

We study a spatial model of party formation in which the set of agendas is the unit circle. We characterize the sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria under the plurality and proportional rules. In both rules, multiple configurations of parties are possible in Nash equilibrium. We refine our predictions using a new notion called “defection-proof” Nash equilibrium. Under the plurality rule, only ...

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for assigning indivisible goods to agents. Although it is well known for its good fairness and welfare properties, it is not strategyproof. In view of this, we address several fundamental questions regarding equilibria under PS. Firstly, we show that Nash deviations under the PS rule can cycle. Despite the possibilities of cycles...

I study Nash implementation when agents might use a tie-breaking rule to choose among the messages they are materially indifferent between. If the planner is endowed with the knowledge of the rule, this might expand or shrink the set of implementable social choice correspondences (SCC) depending on the particular rule used by the agents. The effect might be considerable. For instance, there exi...

We consider customer joining behaviour for a system that consists of a FCFS queue with Bernoulli feedback. A consequence of the feedback characteristic is that the sojourn time of a customer already in the system depends on the joining decisions taken by future arrivals to the system. By establishing stochastic order results for coupled versions of the system, we prove the existence, and unique...

An allocation rule is securely implementable if it is strategy-proof and has no “bad” Nash equilibrium in its associated direct revelation game (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007). We study this implementability notion in allotment economies with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991). The equal division rule and priority rules are characterized on the basis of secure implementability, whic...

We consider a voting setting where candidates have preferences about the outcome of the election and are free to join or leave the election. The corresponding candidacy game, where candidates choose strategically to participate or not, has been studied by Dutta et al. [6], who showed that no non-dictatorial voting procedure satisfying unanimity is candidacy-strategyproof, that is, is such that ...

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of efforts, which we term ‘overspreading.’ We investigate the effects of allocating the prize by a lottery vers...

We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). On our extended domain, we analyze the implications of two central properties which, on the Nash domain, are known to be incompatible: strong monotonicity (Kalai, 1977) and scale invariance...