We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it an O...

In this paper, the generalized forms of the fuzzy core and the Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids are given. An equivalent form of the fuzzy core is researched. In order to better understand the fuzzy core and the Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids, we pay more attention to study three kinds of dynamic fuzzy games on matroids, which are named as fuzzy games w...

This work proposes an explainable artificial intelligence approach to help diagnose COVID-19 patients based on blood test and pathogen variables. Two glass-box models, logistic regression boosting machine, two black-box random forest support vector were used assess the disease diagnosis. Shapley additive explanations explain predictions for while models feature importance brought insights into ...

The Shapley value is arguably the most central normative solution concept in cooperative game theory. It specifies a unique way in which the reward from cooperation can be “fairly” divided among players. While it has a wide range of real world applications, its use is in many cases hampered by the hardness of its computation. A number of researchers have tackled this problem by (i) focusing on ...

We present the results of a galaxy redshift survey in the central region of the Shapley Concentration. Our total sample contains ∼ 2000 radial velocities of galaxies both in the clusters and in the inter-cluster field. We reconstruct the density profile of this supercluster, calculate its overdensity and total mass. Moreover we detect a massive structure behind the Shapley Concentration, at ∼ 3...

An axiomatization of the interaction between the players of any coalition is given. It is based on three axioms: linearity, dummy and symmetry. These interaction indices extend the Banzhaf and Shapley values when using in addition two equivalent recursive axioms. Lastly, we give an expression of the Banzhaf and Shapley interaction indices in terms of pseudo-Boolean functions.

S. Lee, C. Tarantini, P. Gao, J. Jiang, J. D. Weiss, F. Kametani, C. M. Folkman, Y. Zhang, X. Q. Pan, E. E. Hellstrom, D. C. Larbalestier, and C. B. Eom Department of Materials Science and Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706, USA Applied Superconductivity Center, National High Magnetic Field Laboratory, Florida State University, 2031 East Paul Dirac Drive, Tallahasse...

The interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy set (IVIFS) which is an extension of the Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy set is a powerful tool for modeling real life decision making problems. In this paper, we propose the emph{generalized interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy Hamacher generalized Shapley Choquet integral} (GIVIFHGSCI) and the emph{interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy Hamacher general...

The Shapley-Owen power index is reviewed and an algorithm for its computation in two-dimensional spatial voting models is presented. The Shapley-Owen values for ideal point distributions representing the UN Security Council, Bretton Woods institutions, US legislators, as well as Monte Carlo data are considered

We consider Young (1985)'s characterization of the Shapley value, and give a new proof of this axiomatization. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young (1985)'s axiomatization of the Shapley value works on various well-known subclasses of TU games.