We study how competing matchmakers use prices to sort participants into search markets, where they form random pairwise matches, and how equilibrium outcomes compare with monopoly in terms of prices, search market structure and sorting efficiency. The role of prices to facilitate sorting is compromised by the need to survive price competition. We show that the competitive outcome can be less ef...

Previous work on machine scheduling has considered the case of agents who control the scheduled jobs and attempt to minimize their own completion time. We argue that in cloud and grid computing settings, different machines cannot be considered to be fully cooperative as they may belong to competing economic entities, and that agents can easily move their jobs between competing providers. We the...

Why do competing platforms or networks exist? This paper focuses on instances where the value of a platform depends on the adoption decisions of a small number of firms, and analyzes the strategic competition among platforms to get this oligopolistic side on-board. I study a bilateral contracting game among platforms and firms that allows for general externalities across both contracting and no...

In numerous economic applications of matching, the teams that form compete later. For instance, pharmaceuticals assemble R&D teams to develop new drugs and then compete for patents. Such post-match competition in the output market introduces interdependence at the matching stage, as the value of a match depends on the composition of R&D teams in the other firms. This paper develops a matching m...

This paper shows that larger auctions are more efŽ cient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identicalmarkets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We Ž nd that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer–seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin. (JEL: D44, L11)

This paper studies a new coordination game, the Language Game, of a large but finite population. The population is partitioned into two groups of identical agents. Each player shares a common two-action strategy set and interacts pairwise with everyone else. Both symmetric profiles are pareto-efficient strict equilibria, but the groups rank them differently. The profile where successful coordin...