An individual’s learning rule is completely uncoupled if it does not depend directly on the actions or payoffs of anyone else. We propose a variant of log linear learning that is completely uncoupled and that selects an efficient (welfare-maximizing) pure Nash equilibrium in all generic n-person games that possess at least one pure Nash equilibrium. In games that do not have such an equilibrium...

A class of cooperative games arising from shortest path problems is deened. These shortest path games are shown to be totally balanced and allow a population-monotonic allocation scheme. Possible methods for obtaining core elements are indicated; rst, by relating to the allocation rules in taxation and bankruptcy problems, second, by constructing an explicit rule that takes opportunity costs in...

We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/1 queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing (possibly heterogeneous) waiting costs in exchange. The priority of each customer in the queue is a linear function of the individual waiting time, with the purchased coefficient bei...

Typical voting rules do not work well in settings with many candidates. If there are just several hundred candidates, then even a simple task such as choosing a top candidate becomes impractical. Motivated by the hope of developing group consensus mechanisms over the internet, where the numbers of candidates could easily number in the thousands, we study an urn-based voting rule where each part...

This paper provides a characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in settings where agents have one-dimensional or multi-dimensional types, quasi-linear utility functions and interdependent valuations. The characterization is derived in terms of conditions for the underlying allocation function. We do this by making a link to network theory and building complete directed grap...

We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule “imitate the best.” In a redistribution game with utilitarian gov...

In a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players’ voting rights or their impatience. For all monotonic voting rules and discount factors, and for all divisions of the good among players, there exists a stationary proposal-making rule such that this division represents players’ expected payoffs ...

This paper shows how strategic matching generates reputation−building behavior in an evolutionary chain−store game. Strategic matching means the possibility for an entrant to choose in a strategic way the local market into which it will move. Players are boundedly rational and follow behavioral rules simply requiring that the frequency of any strategy enjoying the highest payoff should never de...

Abstract We analyze strategic voting under proportional rule and two parties, embedding the basic spatial model into Poisson framework of population uncertainty. prove that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. show it is characterized by cutpoint in policy space always located between average parties’ positions median distribution voters’ types. also that, as expected number voters goes to i...

conclusions elevated serum pth level was the predictive factor for nash in morbidly obese patients. also, we reported elevated serum liver enzymes, high serum pth levels and older age as predictors of nash in patients seeking obesity surgical treatments. results forty-six patients (34 women, aged 36.5 ± 10.6 years) were analyzed. the mean levels of liver enzymes were significantly higher in the...