This paper incorporates remanufacturing decisions with pricing and supplier and component selection decisions in a multi-level green supply chain with multiple suppliers, one single manufacturer and multiple retailers. The manufacturer purchases optional components of a certain functionality from his alternative suppliers or remanufacture from recycled components and customizes a set of platfor...

This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system, where multiple power beacons (PBs) supply power to a transmitter in order to establish a reliable communication link with multiple legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The transmitter has to harvest radio frequency (RF) energy from multiple PBs due to the shortage of embedded power supply ...

We address the problem of spectrum sharing where competitive operators coexist in the same frequency band. First, we model this problem as a strategic non-cooperative game where operators simultaneously share the spectrum according to the Nash Equilibrium (NE). Given a set of channel realizations, several Nash equilibria exist which renders the outcome of the game unpredictable. Then, in a cogn...

There has been significant recent interest in game theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model; for example, these games are at the heart of major applications such as the ARMOR program deployed for security at the LAX airport since 2007 and the IRIS program in use by the US Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). The f...

This work introduces a new method for computing the incentive Stackelberg solution. Stackelberg games are models for decision making situations, where the parties, called players, act in predetermined order. The first is called the leader and the others are followers. In an incentive game the leader can commit to a decision that depends on the followers' moves. This kind of a strategy is called...

Real-World networks have an inherently dynamic structure and are often composed of communities that are constantly changing in membership. Identifying these communities is of great importance when analyzing structural properties of networks. Hence, recent years have witnessed intense research in of solving the challenging problem of detecting such evolving communities. The mainstream approach t...

This paper develops a decentralized leader-follower game for network design of a competitive supply chain problem in which a new chain as the leader enters a market with one existing supply chain as a follower. Both chains produce an identical product, customer demand is inelastic and customer utility function is based on Huff gravity-based model. The leader wants to shape his network and set a...

This paper investigates the ability of the largest producer in an electricity market to manipulate both the electricity and emission allowances markets to its advantage. A Stackelberg game to analyze this situation is constructed in which the largest firm plays the role of the leader, while the medium-sized firms are treated as Cournot followers with price-taking fringes that behave competitive...

Given a prediction of opponent behavior in a generalsum two-player normal form game, it is difficult to select a strategy that balances the opportunity to use the prediction to inform one’s action with the risk of becoming predictable. We propose Restricted Stackelberg Response with Safety (RSRS), a novel way of generating such a strategy. RSRS uses an r-safe Stackelberg equilibrium in a modifi...