Auction is a mechanism of selling distinct assets that can be both physical objects and virtual objects. Examples of virtual objects are the rights to use assets like airport time slots and FCC spectrum, or to service truckload delivery routes in a transportation network. Under some situations bidding on combinations of objects can render lower total price compare with bidding the objects one a...

In this lecture we examine two different generalizations of the Vickrey auction to a setting where there are multiple distinct items to be allocated, and the agents’ values are define over bundles rather than just individual items. Auctions that allocate multiple distinct items are commonly called “combinatorial” or “package” auctions. The properties of the Vickrey auction we would like to gene...

Generalized Second Price Auction, also known as Ad Word auction, and its variants have been the main mechanism used by search companies to auction positions for sponsored search links. In this paper we study the social welfare of the Nash equilibria of this game under the Bayes-Nash solution concept (i.e., in a partial information setting). In this model, the value of each player for one click ...

A combinatorial auction allows bidders to submit bids on bundles of objects and can be considered the pivotal example of a multiple object auctions. They also constitute a paradigmatic problem in algorithmic mechanism design. We provide an overview of both the computational complexity and strategic complexity inherent in the design of such auctions, and discuss how these challenges are addresse...

A multi-unit combinatorial auction is a combinatorial auction that has some items that can be seen as indistinguishable. Although the mechanism can be applied to dynamic electricity auctions and various purposes, it is difficult to apply to large-scale auction problems due to its computational intractability. In this paper, I present an idea and an analysis about an approximate allocation and p...

Commercial advertising is the main source of income for TV channels and allocation of advertising time slots for maximizing broadcasting revenues is the major problem faced by TV channel planners. In this paper, the problem of scheduling advertisements on prime-time of a TV channel is considered. The problem is formulated as a multi-unit combinatorial auction based mathematical model. This is a...

Most existing methods for scheduling projects are based on centralized or hierarchical decision making using global models. So far, these methods have not produced the desired results, especially in highly dynamic multi-projects environments. In this study, we investigate a new method based on multi-agent systems and a combinatorial auction mechanism to allocate resources for the projects tasks...

In this paper, we study incentive compatible mechanism based on linear pricing scheme for single-minded auction, a restricted case of combinatorial auction, in which each buyer desires a unique fixed bundle of various commodities, improving the previous works [1, 11, 13] on pricing bundles (i.e., payments of buyers).

This article serves as the first part of a two-part series that will provide an overview of the reverse auction concept, building on the best research in the field of supply chain management. In this instalment, we examine the growth of reverse auctions in both private and public sector procurement. We then provide a differentiation between the more readily understood forward auction concept an...

We explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided combinatorial auctions for a previously untested class of value profiles in which synergies arise from shared fixed costs. We find that, in many cases, a simulator that bids straightforwardly does well in predicting auction performance, but exceptions arise because human bidders sometimes rely on cues besides prices to guide their package ...