According to the Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (September 2007), we have the following description for supply chain management: “supply chain management encompasses the planning and management of all activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all logistics management activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and collaboration with channel pa...

We develop a new coordination contract of manufacturer-retailer in a distribution system. A revenue sharing contract based on retail price is modelled, which is more practical to handle channel conflict. We also integrate two concepts of CSR (Corporate Sociality Responsible) and Semi-TDPD (Semi Third Degree Price Discrimination) into our model. Semi-TDPD strategy makes it possible to exploit th...

One of the main concerns of all industries such as mine industries is to increase their profit and keep their customers through improving quality level of their products; but increasing the quality of products usually releases air pollutants. Nowadays the management of air pollutant emissions with harmful environmental and health effects is one of the most pressing problems. In this paper, auth...

This paper investigates the optimal encroachment strategy of product customization and revenue-sharing contract in a two-stage supply chain consisting manufacturer (CM) an original equipment (OEM). In addition to producing wholesaling standard products for OEM, CM has motive manufacture customized under store brand encroach end consumer market. Stackelberg game models with different strategies ...

Recent research shows that in duopolies with strategic delegation, firm owners have an incentive to always share information about managerial compensation contracts. We study how sharing of contract is affected by the presence a supplier. find under quantity competition, partial information‐sharing equilibrium may occur. Firms punish their managers for sales soften supplier pricing. Mandating i...

We investigate how a supply chain, formed by a risk-neutral supplier and a riskaverse retailer, can be coordinated with a supply contract. We demonstrate that the standard wholesale, buy-back or revenue-sharing contracts do not coordinate such a channel. We propose a definition of coordination of the supply chain, and design an easy-to-implement risk-sharing contract that offers the desired dow...

We study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer. The supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end product. We address how different contracts affect the supplier’s capacity decision and hence the profit...

In order to discuss the participation selection strategy of relevant subjects in WEEE recycling, a Stackelberg game model “recyclers—remanufacturers—government” recycling network is constructed, and system’s stability conditions are analyzed. Besides this, direct indirect effects recovery time sensitivity, CRMs’ life expectancy government subsidies on optimal decision-making both recyclers rema...

Intelligent transformation of manufacturers requires smart logistics collaboration, which improves competitiveness. In this study, we construct a Stackelberg game model based on the mutual influence and restriction in relationship between manufacturer service provider (LSP) undergoing transformation. We investigate whether cost-sharing (CS) or revenue-sharing (RS) contracts can coordinate suppl...