We study the choice of a principal to either delegate decision group careerist experts or consult them individually and keep decision-making power. Our model predicts trade-off between information acquisition aggregation. On one hand, expected benefit from being informed is larger in case are consulted individually. Hence, acquire same amount information, depending on cost than delegation. othe...

This paper explores how delegation can be used as a signal to sustain cooperation. I consider static principal–agent model with two tasks, one resembling coordination game. If there is asymmetric information about the agent’s type, principal high private belief delegate first task signal. also supported by forward induction argument. However, in laboratory setting, this equilibrium chosen only ...

Abstract This article develops a non-cooperative game with managerial quantity-setting firms in which owners choose whether to delegate output and abatement decisions managers through contract based on emissions (conventionally denoted as ‘green’ delegation, GD) instead of sales (sales SD), the government levies an tax incentivise firms’ emissions-reduction actions. First, it compares Nash equi...