The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with a nonnegligible probability for any election rule among three alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship...

The Philippines is one of the world's most heavily populated countries. Even though democracy was restored in 1986 after years of occupation and dictatorship, a high level of poverty still exists and malnutrition and communicable diseases continue to be the main cause of morbidity. For almost 50 years people with mental disorders have been treated in a mental hospital setting. The National Ment...

he interpretation and cultural nuances behind the concept of leadership are not only questionable but are subject to different meanings to different people. Yet, within the organisational context, there are specific boundaries that must be adhered to in order to inculcate certain values. Leadership at a political level is not excluded from democratically instated norms. The failure to maintain ...

For one-sided matching problems, two widely studied mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and the Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). The induced outcomes of these two mechanisms are often incomparable and thus there are challenges when it comes to deciding which mechanism to adopt in practice. Working in the space of general preferences, we provide empirical results on the (in)compar...

We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a procedurally fair matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.’s (1999) analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto in terms of a probabilistic serial dictatorship on the set of stable matchings. Second, we show that Aldershof et al.’s...

I examine the role of political institutions in facilitating the adoption of a long-term surplus-maximizing policy when the economy is in transition. In the model I consider, a transition process gradually restructures economic institutions so that the population’s long-term preference may differ from its short-term preference. A democracy may fail to implement the optimal policy if the elector...

Social choice theory argues mathematical models and their logical consequences for group decision making based on individuals’ preference orderings axiomatically. The most basic results have been proved in this field are two impossibility results for group decision making. Arrow’s general (im)possibility theorem for preference aggregation procedures, i.e., there is no nondictatorial social welf...